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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
From the preceding discussion, it can be seen that this is not always so.
Nevertheless, in a field so charged with political and economic impli-
cations, there is little hope that these Recommendations will soon
become law. It is submitted, however, that they should.
X
ARBITRATION AND UNANIMITY AGREEMENTS IN THE CLOSE
CORPORATION
The statutorily expressed public policy of New York favors
majority rule in corporations and the unhindered discretion of
directors.' Varied and repeated attempts have been made to circum-
vent this policy through the use of stockholder agreements. In
Manson v. Curtis,2 for example, the plaintiff permitted the defendant
to become the majority shareholder on condition that the plaintiff
continue to manage the corporation, with the directors as mere figure-
heads. This agreement was held invalid as violative of public policy
inasmuch as it created a sterile board of directors. However, the
unanimity agreement,3 a more moderate deviation from the statutory
norm, ultimately received legislative sanction.4 Some of the difficulties
1 "The business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors.
[A] majority of the board . . . shall be necessary to constitute a quorum
and the act of a majority ... shall be the act of the board." N.Y. GEN.
CORaP. LAW § 27. See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 117,
60 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1945).
2223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918). Later cases relaxed the rigid attitude
of the court in the Manson decision. In McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323,
189 N.E. 234 (1934), the plaintiff, a dismissed director, sought specific per-
formance of an agreement whereby the defendants were obligated to use their
best efforts to continue him as director and officer of the corporation. The
court held the agreement to be invalid because it destroyed the discretion of the
directors. Indicative of a liberal trend, however, was the concurring opinion
of Judge Lehman, maintaining that agreements to vote for one another were
valid even then. Two years later, in Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E.
641 (1936), an agreement to vote for the plaintiff as director and general man-
ager was upheld since there was no rigid public policy involved. In Matter of
Buckley, 183 Misc. 189, 50 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct. 1944), a by-law that pro-
hibited removal of the chairman of the board or president without cause was
upheld for the same reason. The court so held despite the fact that the cor-
poration was large and all the stockholders had never assented. See 45 COLUM.
L. REv. 960, 963 n.15 (1945). Prior to this case it was thought that unanimity
was essential for any deviation from the statutory norm.
3 By a requirement of unanimous concurrence for all actions of the cor-
poration, minority stockholders retain a veto power over the acts of the ma-
jority. See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., supra note 1; 1948 LEG. Doc.
No. 65(K), REPORT, N.Y. LAW RmISlON ColmmssioN 5 (1948).
4 N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 9. See also 1948 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), op. cit.
sapra note 3, at 5-9.
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raised by such agreements will be treated in this Note, with particular
emphasis on the problems presented by the interplay of unanimity and
arbitration agreements.
Historical Background
The unanimity agreement was first passed upon in Ripin v.
United States Woven Label Co.5  In that case the court upheld a
requirement in the certificate of incorporation that the shareholders
must unanimously consent to any change in the number of directors.
This arrangement was sanctioned though it constituted a slight in-
fringement on the statute which provided that the number of directors
could be increased or reduced "when the stockholders owning a ma-
jority of the stock of the corporation shall so determine." 6 Nine
years later, however, a unanimity agreement was voided in Matter of
Boulevard Theatre and Realty Co." It was there held that a clause
in the certificate of incorporation requiring unanimous consent of the
stockholders to elect directors contravened Section 25 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law, which provides for directors to be
chosen by a plurality of the votes. In Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel,
Inc.,8 the by-laws of the defendant corporation required unanimous
consent for: (1) all shareholders' resolutions; (2) all elections of
directors; (3) all directors' resolutions; and (4) all amendments of
the by-laws by the shareholders. A divided Court of Appeals struck
down the first three by-laws as violative of majority rule which was
felt to be "an essential part of the State policy." 9 In addition, it was
stated that unanimity agreements were unworkable because they tend
to create deadlocks.
As a result of the Benintendi decision and its predecessors,
Section 9 of the Stock Corporation Law was passed.' 0  This statute
represents an ingenious effort to grant statutory sanction to the
"incorporated partnership," without arbitrarily defining it in terms of
capitalization or number of stockholders." As amended, Section 9
5 205 N.Y. 442, 98 N.E. 855 (1912).
6 At the time of the Ripin decision, Section 21 of the Stock Corporation
Law provided as follows: "The number of directors of any stock corporation
may be increased or reduced, but not above the maximum nor below the mini-
mum number prescribed by law, when the stockholders owning a majority of
the stock of the corporation shall so determine, at a meeting. . . ." Ripin v.
United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 445, 98 N.E. 855, 856 (1912).
7 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N.Y. Supp. 430 (1st Dep't), aff'd inern., 231 N.Y.
615, 132 N.E. 910 (1921).
8 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).9 Id. at 117, 60 N.E.2d at 830 (emphasis added). Accord, Kaplan v. Block,
183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944). But see Kantzler v. Benzinger, 214 Ill.
589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905).
10 1948 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), REPoRT, N.Y. LAw REvisiox CommissoN 15
(1948) ; Recent Statute, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 526, 527 (1949).
11 1948 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), op. cit. supra note 10, at 6. See Israeis, The
Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoiRN=u. L.Q. 488, 491 (1948).
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authorizes the insertion in a corporate charter of provisions requiring
more than a majority or plurality for a quorum, vote, or consent of
directors or shareholders. To limit its application to close corpora-
tions, however, the statute requires so great a majority for the adop-
tion of these provisions that it is practically impossible for any but a
close corporation to utilize them. Thus the protection of majority
rule in large corporations is retained, while the "incorporated partner-
ship" is sanctioned. Since unanimity agreements have received this
statutory approval, there seems to have been an increase in the number
of disputes and deadlocks 12 warned against in the Benintendi case.
Arbitration clauses have furnished a partial answer to the problem,
but since arbitration has only recently come into its own, its full effect
is unknown.
Development of Arbitration
At common law it was held that executory arbitration agreements
could be revoked.13 Lord Coke declared this to be the rule in Vynior's
Case,14 in an effort to guard against encroachments on the jurisdiction
of the courts. Only after an award had been made would equity
specifically enforce such agreements. 15 Furthermore, a party to an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes could resort to the courts de-
spite the agreement, and that breach of contract could not be raised
as a defense. 6 New York, in 1920, became the first state to pass an
arbitration statute broad enough to encompass "future disputes." 17
This legislation authorizes direct enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments by a court order compelling arbitration, and indirect enforce-
ment by staying any action commenced in violation of an arbitration
clause. Although this statute removes the most formidable obstacle
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements, strict statutory construc-
tion of the new act, at first, frustrated the legislature's intent to
liberalize arbitration.' 8
12 See 1951 LEG. Doc. No. 65(H), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION COaMISSION
12, 41-42 (1951) ; O'Neal, Resolving Disputes In Closely Held Corporations:
Intra-Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARV. L. REV. 786, 787, 793 n.21 (1954).
13 See O'Neal, supra note 12, at 794; Note, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 254, 255(1950). For a comprehensive coverage of the law of arbitration, see PRASHKER,
NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 538A-538I (3d ed. 1954).
14 ".. . [I] f I submit myself to an arbitrament . . . yet I may revoke it,
for my act or my words cannot alter the judgement of the law to make that
irrevocable, which is of its own nature revocable." Vynior's Case, 8 Co.
81b-82a, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 599-600 (K.B. 1609).
15 See note 13 supra. See also Simpson, Specific Enforcement Of Arbitra-
tion Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 160 (1934).
16 See note 13 supra.
17 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1448-69. See Hornstein, Arbitration Provisions
in Stockholders' Agreements, 10 ARB. J. (n.s.) 67, 68 (1955).
Is See Matter of Stern, 285 N.Y. 239, 33 N.E.2d 689 (1941) ; Matter of
Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924); Matter of Benedict, 265 App.
Div. 518, 39 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1st Dep't 1943) (per curiam); Hornstein.
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Arbitration clauses concerning corporate activities have had a
particularly turbulent history. In Matter of Allied Fruit & Extract
Co., 9 decided in 1934, the directors of a close corporation removed
one of their number for cause but did not first submit the question to
the agreed arbitration. The court ruled that the arbitration agree-
ment was invalid because it encroached upon the discretion of the
corporation's directors. In more recent years a favorable attitude was
adopted, but hostility was still reflected in some of the cases. In
Matter of Hess,20 where the board of directors was evenly divided,
the corporation was ordered dissolved even though the stockholders
had agreed to arbitrate differences. As late as 1948, the Appellate
Division affirmed a lower court holding that a shareholder could main-
tain a derivative suit against a shareholder-director for an accounting,
despite the existence of a stockholders' agreement for the arbitration
of disputes. 21 It was stated that even if the issues had been arbitrable,
the agreement would have been against public policy and thus
unenforceable.
The first decision favoring the arbitration of corporate disagree-
ments was Matter of DeCaro.2 2  There the Second Department of
the Appellate Division affirmed an arbitration award that "related to
the management of the business of a corporation," as the only feasible
solution to a dispute that threatened to ruin the business. The fol-
lowing year the same court enforced a pre-incorporation shareholders'
agreement to arbitrate controversies concerning management.23 Al-
though both of these cases judicially approved arbitration agreements,
neither went as far as Martocci v. Martocci.24 In that case, three
brothers agreed to perpetuate one another as directors and officers of
a close corporation on the condition of good and faithful performance.
All disputes were to be arbitrated by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation. The court held that the removed director was entitled to
arbitration. It was reasoned that retention in office was based upon
bona fide performance, thus discretion was left in the board of di-
Stockholders" Agreements In The Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040,
1051-52 (1950).
19243 App. Div. 52, 276 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1934), motion for leave
to appeal denied, 266 N. Y. l.v. (1935).
20 108 N.Y.L.J. 555, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 11, 1942).21 Application of Diamond, 80 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 274 App. Div.
762, 79 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1st Dep't 1948). The lower court held: (1) the issues
involved in the derivative suit were not referable to arbitration under the
agreement; (2) the- agreement covered the relationships of the stockholders
inter se and not as officers and directors; and (3) the corporation was not a
party to the agreement.
22 261 App. Div. 975, 25 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't 1941) (mem. opinion).
23 Matter of Carl, 263 App. Div. 887, 32 N.Y.S.2d 410 (2d Dept 1942)
(mem. opinion).
2442 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 266 App. Div. 840, 43 N.Y.S.2d 516
(1st Dep't 1943). See also In re Keilsohn Offset Co., 120 N.Y.L.J. 1348, col. 5(Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 1948).
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rectors. This decision is generally accepted as having overruled the
Allied Fruit case. In Matter of Landersman,25 the court indicated
that Allied Fruit must "be read in the light of the affirmance in this
court ... [of] Martocci v. Martocci .. ,, 26 Therefore, it was held
that the discharge of a director for impropriety should be arbitrated
according to a pre-incorporation agreement.2 7  Although the New
York Court of Appeals did not render any of these decisions, an in-
dication of its attitude is found in Matter of Myers.26 There the
validity of an arbitration agreement was presumed and properly
brought dissolution proceedings were stayed.
Outside New York there are only a handful of cases involving
arbitration in close corporations. Though these cases generally
indicate that an unfavorable attitude exists, 29 Ringling v. Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.,30 still stands as a
landmark case embodying the liberal view. There, two sisters agreed
to cast their votes for the same candidates for directors, subject to
arbitration if they failed to agree. When a disagreement arose, the
loser voted against the candidate designated by the arbitrator. The
Delaware court enforced the agreement by setting aside those votes.
Unanimity Agreements vs. Arbitration Agreements
Two cases recently decided in New York serve to illustrate the
problems which may arise when both arbitration and unanimity agree-
ments are present. Application of Katz 31 and Matter of Burkin 3 2
involved development corporations in which Burkin and his son were
the majority, and Katz the minority, stockholders. The certificates
of incorporation provided that all directors must be present for a
quorum and that unanimous consent was necessary before the stock-
holders or directors could undertake any action. In addition, they
required that all directors and officers be elected unanimously and
that no officer or director could be removed except after receipt of
his resignation. As a precaution against deadlock, the certificates of
incorporation contained a stipulation to arbitrate "any arbitrable con-
25280 App. Div. 963, 116 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1st Dep't 1952) (mem. opinion).
26 Ibid.
27 For the facts in the Landersan, case, see Matter of Burkin, 286 App.
Div. 740, 744-45, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6-7 (1st Dep't 1955); O'Neal, Resolving
Disputes In Closely Held Corporations: Intra-Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 786, 802 (1954).
28 304 N.Y. 656, 107 N.E.2d 512 (1952) (mem. opinion).
29 See, e.g., Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). In
the Whitson case, an arbitration clause pertaining to an arrangement similar to
a voting trust agreement was held invalid.
30 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946), modified, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d
441 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
31 143 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mern., 1 App. Div. 2d 657, 147 N.Y.S.2d
10 (1st Dep't 1955).
32286 App. Div. 740, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1st Dep't 1955).
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troversy that may arise among the sole stockholders by reason of the
terms of the agreements or by reason of any other cause." 33 Disputes
concerning the operation of the corporations resulted in Katz being
ousted as a director, despite the stockholders' agreements. In
Application of Katz, the court reinstated him holding that his removal
was illegal because of the unanimity agreement. When Katz then
sought to arbitrate the question of whether Burkin and his son should
be removed as directors, they moved for a stay of arbitration. In
Matter of Burkin, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the
Special Term that the issue was arbitrable.
In the Burkin case, Katz, as the minority stockholder, was un-
able to vote the removal of the Burkins. Even if he had controlled
a majority, he would have been defeated by the unanimity clause, as
were the Burkins.3 4 Since a declaratory judgment action is not main-
tainable 35 and action by the Attorney General is, as a practical matter,
unavailable,36 the arbitration clause provided the sole remedy out-
side of dissolution. Though Martocci v. Martocci and Matter of
Landersnman held the removal of a director to be an arbitrable contro-
versy, the decision in the Burkin case was by no means a foregone
conclusion. The Court of Appeals only a short time before had nar-
rowly construed this arbitration clause and held it inapplicable to the
question of whether the assets of the corporation should be sold.37
In addition, the law as to whether the subject of a stockholders' de-
rivative action is an arbitrable controversy is unsettled.38 The court,
following the Martocci case, seemed to regard the fact that a close
corporation was involved as controlling 3 9 and continued the trend of
liberal construction of arbitration clauses.40
33 Id. at 741, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
34 See Application of Katz, supra note 31; Matter of Burkin, 286 App. Div.
740,1 745, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (1st Dep't 1955) (dictum).
35Jos. H. Carter, Inc. v. Carter, 205 Misc. 192, 127 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct.
1953), aff'd snen., 283 App. Div. 858, 129 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1954). See
Matter of Burkin, supra note 34 at 745, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
36 N.Y. GEN. Corn,. LAW §§ 60, 61. Under these sections, no one but the
Attorney General is authorized to bring a court action for removal. See Matter
of Burkin, supra note 34 at 745, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
37 Matter of Katz, 308 N.Y. 789, 125 N.E.2d 433 (1955), affirming, 283 App.
Div. 1092, 131 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d Dep't 1954).
38 See Application of Diamond, 80 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 274 App.
Div. 762, 79 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1st Dep't 1948); Pfeiffer v. Berke, 121 N.Y.S.2d
774 (Sup. Ct. 1953). But see Matter of Carl, 263 App. Div. 887, 32 N.Y.S.2d
410 (2d Dep't 1942) (mem. opinion); Lumsden v. Lumsden Bros. & Taylor,
Inc., 242 App. Div. 852, 275 N.Y. Supp. 221, 222 (2d Dep't 1934) (mene.
opinion). See also O'Neal, Resolving Disputes In Closely Held Corporations:
Intra-Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARV. L. REv. 786, 809 (1954).
39 See Matter of Burkin, 286 App. Div. 740, 744, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (1st
Dep't 1955).
40 As manifestations of this trend, see Application of Gail Kiddie Clothes,
Inc., 56 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1945); cf. Matter of Abbey, 274 App. Div. 389,
83 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1948) (dissenting opinion), aff'd mein., 299 N.Y.
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The decision by no means completely resolves the dilemma fos-
tered by a close corporation having both arbitration and unanimity
clauses. Presuming that the arbitrator finds that cause exists for the
removal of the Burkins and they are removed, the fact remains that
they are still majority shareholders in the corporation. As such they
might attempt to re-elect themselves directors, or at least insist upon
the election of their own candidates. With the aid of the unanimity
clause, they could throw the corporation into a deadlock if Katz did
not accede to their demands. They could also harass Katz with ac-
tions for misconduct 41 and stockholders' derivative actions, 42 or, pre-
suming such charges arbitrable, with interminable arbitrations. It
would seem that one way to avoid these difficulties would be for the
parties to agree in advance that a director removed by arbitration
must sell his holdings to the other parties or to the corporation.
Professor O'Neal suggests the use of such a prior contract as a means
of preventing dissolution in corporations that have no arbitration
clause; 48 it would seem to be equally applicable here.
Conclusion
The holding that the question of removal is arbitrable in a close
corporation is a logical extension of the concept of arbitrable con-
troversies, even in the face of the difficulties pointed out. Though the
innocent party might eventually have to resort to dissolution 44 as the
only escape from an impossible situation, arbitration at least defers
the day of reckoning and allows time for a solution to be adopted.
In the case of a prosperous corporation, where dissolution will inflict
a great loss on all parties, such a cooling off period may be invaluable.
557, 85 N.E.2d 789 (1949); Park Construction Co. v. Independent School
Dist. No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475, 477 (1941).
The Burkin case is presently on appeal to the Court of Appeals. 135
N.Y.L.J. 6, col. 1 (N.Y. Ct. App. March 26, 1956). "Motion to have the
appeal heard upon the record in proceeding No. 2 in this case together with
available copies of the records before the Appellate Division in proceeding No. 1
and in Matter of Katz v. Fulton-Washington Corporation granted. Cross-motion
to dismiss appeal denied without prejudice to a renewal thereof upon the argu-
ment of the appeal." Ibid.
41 N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 60, 61.
42 See PRASHKER, CORPORATIONS 787-88 (2d ed. 1949). A member of a close
corporation would almost never be required to post security for expenses under
N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b. This section provides that a shareholder whose
stock is worth more than $50,000, or amounts to 5% or more of the total number
of shares, does not have to post security.
4 See O'Neal, Resolving Disputes In Closely Held Corporations: Intra-
Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARv. L. REV. 786, 809 (1954).
44 N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 103. If a board of directors is so divided that it
cannot take action or the stockholders are so divided that they cannot elect
directors, a prescribed percentage of stockholders can petition for dissolution
by virtue of this statute. See also N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 101 pertaining to
petition by the directors.
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The Burkin and Katz cases suggest a problem which would be
even more difficult to solve. A situation could arise where a director's
conduct warranted his removal from the board of a close corporation
that had a unanimity, but no arbitration, agreement. Although it has
been held that good faith and competent performance are always im-
plied terms, despite any provision in the agreements, 45 a unanimity
clause prevents removal even where there has been a breach of these
implied terms. In los. H. Carter, Inc. v. Carter,4 6 where a unanimity
agreement was present, a declaratory judgment that removal was
warranted was denied. Matter of Katz, of course, was almost pre-
cisely on point in holding that even a majority does not have the
right to remove in the face of a unanimity clause, whether cause exists
or not. Stockholders' and directors' actions under Sections 60 and 61
of the General Corporation Law and stockholders' derivative actions
are unsatisfactory because they only permit the recovery of damages.47
A court action for removal is also of limited value because it can only
be brought by the Attorney General. 48 Under present circumstances
then, an action for dissolution is the only permanent remedy available.
Even dissolution leaves much to be desired since it could work to the
advantage of the wrongdoer. 49 Where the corporation is prosperous
and the innocent party cannot afford to purchase its assets, dissolution
may be more impractical than the other remedies.
It is clear that legislation which will authorize removal in such a
situation is necessary. One improvement would be statutory author-
ization for a stockholder to bring a court action for removal if the
Attorney General does not do so within a reasonable time after he has
been petitioned to act. Though a director removed in this manner
could still harass the corporation as easily as one who is arbitrated
out of office, the mere existence of such a remedy might restrain
wrongdoing.
45 See Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931); cf. Abberger v.
Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 212, 281 N.Y. Supp. 373, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
46205 Misc. 192, 127 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div.
858, 129 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1954).
47 Both these remedies can be used to recover damages for the misconduct
of a director, but are not available for removal.4 8 N.Y. GEr. CoRP. LAW §§ 60, 61, Purdy v. Humphrey, 192 Misc. 309,
82 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 1947), af'd, 274 App. Div. 841, 82 N.Y.S.2d 388(4th Dep't 1948).
49 See Matter of Burkin, 286 App. Div. 740, 746-47, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2. 8-9
(1st Dep't 1955); Matter of Zybert, 276 App. Div. 1070, 96 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1st Dep't) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 301 N.Y. 632, 93 N.E.2d 917 (1950).
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